Travel Insecurity – Why the TSA Has Not Made Us Safer

If you have traveled by air any time in the last few years you known the routine: Stand in huge security lines . . .take off your coat, belt and shoes . . . put all change and metal objects in a tray . . . unpack your laptop . . and be prepared to be patted down or interrogated if you sweat a lot, someone thinks you look suspicious, or you just have bad luck.

Then there are the “no-fly” and watch lists, secret government databases which now have over 119,000 U.S. citizens on them, and hundreds of thousands more non-citizens. Many on the lists have no business being on them. 60 Minutes recently obtained a copy of the lists and found that everyone
named “Robert Smith” in the U.S. is on the watch list because some alleged terrorist allegedly once used that name as an alias. “Unlikely Terrorists On No-Fly List,” 10-8-06, 60 Minutes, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/10/05/60minutes/printable2066624.shtml

You would think the TSA could tell the difference between the 20-something alleged terrorist who once used the name “Robert Smith” and 80-year-old men or 7-year-old kids, but no, everyone named
“Robert Smith” gets extra scrutiny and sometimes is denied boarding. The president of Bolivia is also on
the list because his name is similar to that of some alleged terrorist, as is Democratic congresswoman Loretta Sanchez, who has been a strong critic of TSA lists.

What’s more, thousands of people are added to the lists every week, and the TSA has no provision for ever getting off. Even the criteria for being listed is a government secret. At best, if you are
erroneously put on a no-fly list, you may be able to get on another “correction list,” which may help you get on a plane at some airports. All of this “security” might make some sense if it worked or if it made us much safer, but it doesn’t.

TSA tests earlier this year found that undercover agents were able to get knives, guns, and simulated bombs on planes more often than not, and at about the same rate as before the TSA was created — despite a cost of billions of your taxpayer dollars. (Many TSA employees are paid 2-3 times what their private counterparts get.) Some “security” measures make no sense whatsoever. For example, while shoes are routinely screened for explosives, an April 2005 Department of Homeland Security report found that current X-Ray machines are unable to detect explosives. (“Quit Xraying Shoes,” Contra Costa Times, 8-16-06.)

The same is true for most liquid explosives. Yet the TSA continues with the charade of “checking them,” “because it makes people feel safer.” Worst of all, while airline passengers are heavily screened, 5 years after 9-11 there is no screening for mechanics, food-service personnel, baggage
handlers and dozens of others who enter airports through largely unscreened “employee-only” entrances.

In addition, some 90% of air cargo is still unscreened, and much of it is picked up from cargo bins in unguarded lots, where anyone could put in a package with a time bomb. I don’t know about you, but I’m a lot more concerned about food-service personnel, mechanics, and cargo handlers smuggling in bombs and poisoned food, than I am concerned about passengers with “illegal nail files” or lipsticks.

One final note: In the rush to staff the TSA, background checks on thousands of employees were delayed or waived, resulting in the hiring of thousands of convicted felons. The bottom line: TSA-enforced safety is largely a fraud, which at best makes people feel safer — at the cost of our privacy, dignity, and freedom to travel.

Some post-9/11 airline security measures certainly make sense, such as securing cockpit doors, arming pilots, and screening baggage and cargo for explosives. However, treating passengers like dangerous cattle makes no sense at all.

What should be done about current TSA security?

-Drastically cut security for passengers, including immediately ending the X-raying of shoes and bans
on liquids and gels.

-Accelerate arming pilots.

-Screen all cargo for explosives as soon as possible, and screen all airline food.

-Limit “no-fly” and watch lists, and have a clear and simple procedure for getting off the lists for those
erroneously put on.

-Abolish the Transportation Security Agency. It is far cheaper, safer, and less intrusive to let airlines
and airports handle their own security.